BOARD CHARACTERISTICS, ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIAL

GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE:

EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA PUBLIC LISTED COMPANIES by FAISAL, Faisal
 
 
 
ICGA 2018 
The 2018 Fifth International Conference on Governance and Accountability 
ICGA2018, all rights reserved. 
BOARD CHARACTERISTICS, ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIAL 
GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE: 
EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA PUBLIC LISTED COMPANIES  
 
Andri Prastiwi , Faisal Faisal*, Etna Nur Afri Yuyetta 
Accounting Department, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Diponegoro, Semarang, Indonesia 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the relationship between board characteristics and environmental social governance 
disclosure (ESGD) practices. Also, it examines whether such the disclosure influence corporate performance. 
Seventy-three public listed companies that have ESGD score in 2015 were used as sample. Multiple regression 
analysis was applied to test whether size of board of commissioners and board of directors have a siginifcant 
effect on ESGD. The results show that (1) the size of board commissioners has a negative effect on corporate 
performance (2) the larger size of boards of directors the lower of ESGD. However, in terms of the relationship 
between ESGD and corporate performance, this study provide evidence that there is no relationship between 
these variables.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  There is a paradoxical situation in Indonesia regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
practices and disclosures. On the practice side, various provisions that encourage various parties and 
corporate entities to care and implement CSR have responded CSR. There are approximately 12 
regulations governing CSR practices. However, the results of the study indicate that there are still 
many things that need to be improved, especially related to social issues (see Sulaiman et al., 2014), 
concepts and implementation (see Waagstein, 2011), poor implementation of CSR (see Retnaningsih, 
2015) CSR practices are still philanthropic (Prayogo, 2013), even political influence (see Rosser & 
Edwin, 2010). On the disclosure side, the results of these studies indicate that social performance has 
no effect on company performance (Fauzi et al., 2007). These results indicate that investors have not 
considered CSR as a important factors in decision making yet. This finding also implies there is a lack 
of community participation in CSR implementation such as Sulaiman et al. (2014) findings. 
  The different results are given by Ratmono et al. (2014), which found that CSR disclosure 
may reduce earnings management. These findings indicate that there is an improvement of the 
company's perspective on the importance of CSR information as constructing a responsible corporate 
profile and behavior. In addition, from the institutional point of view, providing extensive CSR 
information will reduce information asymmetry, which means increased corporate transparency. The 
latest issue related to corporate transparency is environmental social and governance disclosures 
(ESGD). Although this issue has emerged a decade ago, but until 2016, the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(IDX) has not offered written guidelines for ESG reporting, ESG-related training, and has not required 
ESG reporting as a listing rule (SSEI, 2016). Eventhough, according to the United Nations (UN) 
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Sustainable Stock Exchange (SSE) initiative, by late 2030, all companies are expected to report the 
impact of social and environmental practices (SSE, 2015). 
  The development of voluntary disclosure has led to new measurement ideas. However, CSR 
disclosure remains the focus of researchers because of the growing variety of disclosures. The 
development of CSR disclosure initiated from CSR in a stand-alone annual report, sustainability 
reporting (SR), integrated reporting (IR) and ESGD is the latest. ESGD leads to a new measurement 
approach related to corporate transparency. The new measure for corporate transparency that has been 
being concern is the ESGD score. According to Li et al. (2018) ESGD Score is a comprehensive 
measure for ESGD. The score has a social, environmental and governance component in a single 
number, it is different from previous measurements that often focus on one component only. Al-
Tuwaijiri et al. (2004) and Said et al. (2013), for example, focusing on environmental disclosure, 
Belkaoui & Karpik (1989) emphasizes the disclosure of social programs and Light et al. (2008) use 
GRI Index but only focus on social component. Disclosure Index with social and environmental 
components has also been widely used (see Ho & Taylor, 2007; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a, 2008b; 
Said et al., 2009), but rare indices that include governance component in disclosure indices except 
Clarckson et al . (2008). 
  This difference in measurement has the potential to cause the relationship pattern and the 
results of the current study are irrelevant. To ensure this, this study aims to re-examine the pattern of 
relationships between the causal factors and CSRD represented ESGD score and also its 
consequences. The latest reserach reveals that despite increasing attention to the practice of ESGD, the 
question of whether ESG information can create value remains unexplored (Li et al., 2018). This leads 
to the consequence model that will provide information how investors respond to transparency by 
companies, as well as provide specific evidence in the context of developing countries, namely 
Indonesia. This context is different from the research of Li et al. (2018) and Fatemi et al. (2017), 
which uses sample companies in developed countries, namely the UK and US. 
  As a mention before that existing ESG studies mostly focus on the consequences of ESG. 
Some variables consequences were used by researchers, for example, Tobin's Q by Li et al. (2018) and 
Fatemi et al. (2017) sovereign borrowing costs by Crifo et al. (2017), CAPM by Jones & Frost (2017), 
asymmetry of market information (spread) by Siew et al. (2016), ROA by Giannarakis et al. (2016), 
and market adjusted returns (Farooq, 2015). There is still very limited research evidence on the 
underlying causes of ESGD (Li et al., 2018).  Therefore, this study analyzes the antecedents and 
consequences of ESG disclosure. By analyzing the antecedents, it can provide information, what 
factors should be encouraged and what factors should be eliminated to improve transparency. The 
consequence model can provide evidence how investors and companies behave towards information 
transparency. 
  A factor that has a control function on corporate management is corporate governance (CG), 
which has a very complex function. Following the CG definition of the World Bank, CG should be 
able to ensure that the company obtains resources and uses them efficiently for shareholder welfare 
simultaneously meeting the interests of stakeholders (Maassen, 2002). The CG component 
representing the interests of the shareholders is the board of commissioners, and will be the antecedent 
variable observed in this study. Previous research, Giannarakis et al. (2016) connects the board of 
commissioners proxied by board size (BS) to the performance of the company proxied by ROA. In 
their study, BS was treated as a control variable, but it found BS had no effect on ROA. 
  In addition to the board of commissioners, the board of directors will also be observed as an 
antecedent variable, since the director is a key actor of corporate transparency. Li et al. (2018) has 
tested power CEO as a moderating variable in influencing ESGD relationships with firm value. Their 
results show that CEO power increased the influence of ESGD on corporate value. However, there is 
no evidence, whether the CEO has an effect on ESGD. That is the reason to associate board 
characteristics and ESGD must be conducted. The results of this study can provide evidence about the 
antecedents of ESGD. The antecedent model is expected to answer Li et al. (2018) questions, on 
drivers/causes of ESG disclosure and provides evidence of measurement sensitivity to previous 
research results.  
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. Board Characteristics and ESGD 
	 	
The board of commissioners and the board of directors are key components of CG (Said et al., 
2009), because these two organs embed in the company, which means, they have direct access to the 
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company. In agency theory perspective, the board of commissioners as a representation of the 
shareholder interest; called principal, have to oversee what the board of directors; as an agent; manage 
business properly. Board size is total members of the board either executive (called board of directors) 
or non-executive directors (board of commissioners). Board size is one of the characteristics of the 
board, which have became the focus of researchers. Zaheer (2013) contends that large board size 
allows it to dominate the company’s management, in this term; board can execute its role and function 
effectively.  Furhtermore, Laksamana (2008) states that large board brings expertise diversity in 
financial and management terms. These diversity leads to variation ideas and activities, which drive to 
disclose more. Previous literature supports the phenomenon that the higher disclosure level is related 
to larger board size and the evidence shows positive relationship between board size and level of 
firm’s disclosure (Barako et al., 2006). Zaheer (2013) also found positive relationship between size of 
board and corporate governance disclosure. Similar with Zaheer (2013), Yusoff et al. (2016) and Jizi 
et al. (2014), found a positive relationship between board size and CSR disclosure. Even, Said et al. 
(2009) hypothesize negative relationship, but they found positive results. 
The other perspective, however, shows negative relationship between board size and 
disclosure. Said et al. (2009) identifies from previous studies that board size relate to coordination and 
communication problems and management control capabilities. Moreover, large boards will increase 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders (Raheja, 2003; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Lipton 
and Lorsh, 1992), thus bring in less effective decisions and allowing the CEO to control the board of 
commissioners (Jensen, 1993). These problems lead to inability of the board of commissioners to 
carry out their roles effectively, which is encourages transparency as mandated by the OECD (2014). 
Research with models on principles of cohesion show the benefits of small board (Brown and 
Mahoney, 1992; Bantel and Jackson, 1989). Cohesiveness in viewpoints of small board can intensify 
monitoring capabilities. Goodstein et al. (1994) proposed that board size negatively affects board 
members in strategic decision making and found negative association between board size and 
disclosure. Small board also supported by the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) and 
the Higgs Report (Higgs, 2003).  
Conceptual framework and research evidence show two main streams in elucidating the 
relationships between board size and disclosure. Indeed, it need more observation to clarify this 
association, therefore, this paper takes no sign in hypotheses, as follows: 
H1: There is a relationship between board characteristics and ESGD 
2.2 Board characteristics and corporate performance 
 
In HLFC (2000) definition, the function of CG is to promote the improvement of business 
prosperity and accountability with the primary objective of realizing long-term shareholder value 
(Mansor et al., 2013). In line with that, agency theory perspective posits board of commissioners is as 
a controller to monitor management operating the business properly. Previous studies on board size 
have provided inconclusive framework. Similarly, study of the relationship between board size and 
disclosure, research of the relationship between board size and corporate performance have produced 
mixed results (Blibech & Berrales, 2018). 
On the one side, large boards provide resource and expertise or knowledge to contribute to 
corporate performance (Linck et al., 2008, Dalton et al., 1999, and Pearce and Zahra 1992). Moreover, 
Carter et al. (2010) and Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) suggest that large board has more 
problem solving capabilities. These conditions	 should make the job easier and so allowing 
achieving predetermined target. García-Olalla and García-Ramos (2010) emphasized that board size 
increases corporate performance. Similarly, Grove et al. (2011) found positive relationship between 
board size and corporate performance.  
On the other side, small boards make controlling activities more effective, diminishing 
agency conflict, easier coordination, accelerating decision making, and hampering dysfunctional 
behavior of directors (Adams and Mehran, 2003, Ginglinger, 2002).	Realizing the objective needs a 
solid team in board of commissioners. Large board emerge coordination, communication and 
decision-making problems, then board of commissioners cannot work in the best way, that obstructing 
in achieving good corporate performance. Thus, board size negatively relate to company’s 
performance as Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) findings. There is an opposite stream on 
this association, so this paper do not determine sign on the hypotheses, as follows: 
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H2: There is a relationship between board characteristics and corporate performance 
 
2.3 ESGD and corporate performance 
 
Stakeholder power is one of the three dimensions (stakeholder power, strategic posture and 
economic performance) developed by Ullmann (1985) based on the Freeman concept (1983). 
Stakeholder power in influencing corporate management is considered as a function of the degree of 
control over the resources required by a company. The more important resources derived from the 
stakeholders, the greater stakeholder demand will be met. In addition, the stakeholder approach 
discusses the role of CSR information in influencing parties outside the company, such as increased 
access to capital (Roberts, 1992), signals improvement of social and environmental behavior (Branco 
& Rodrigues, 2008) and enhancement of corporate reputation (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Bayoud, 
Kavanagh, & Slaughter, 2012).  
The business policy and corporate planning model, and social responsibility model are two 
models of Freeman (1983) stakeholder concept development. ESGD can be a business policy that is 
planned, developed and evaluated in a corporate strategic decision and at the same time embodies the 
corporate social responsibility. The first model is intended for stakeholder groups that are expected 
always to support the company. Freeman called this group as non-adversarial. They include 
customers, owners, and suppliers and public that always support corporate.  
The second model is devoted to a group called adversarial, i.e. groups with opposition 
positions, such as regulator regulators or groups with a particular interest in social issues. Strategy is 
arranged to achieve corporate performance objectives. If ESGD becomes a corporate strategy, it is 
expected that stakeholders will be more involved to the company. Therefore, the more transparent the 
ESGD will produce the better corporate performance aligned with Patterson (2013). Li et al (2018) 
dan El Ghoul et al. (2016) found positive relationship between ESGD and Tobin’s Q. Third 
hypothesis based stakeholder theory is as follows: 
H3: There is a positive association between ESG and corporate performance 
3. METHODS 
 There are 75  companies that having ESGD score in the 2015 fiscal year sourced from 
Bloomberg database. Two companies do not have complete data, so the final samples were 73 
companies. The data consisted of 15 manufacturing companies, and the rest (58) were non 
manufacturing companies. Although, ESGD score have been available since 2009, however, the data 
don’t have been consistent yet in disclosure. That is why, this study use the 2015. 
Antecedent and consequence models was examined in this study. Both models use causality approach 
with multiple regression in testing. Antecedent model posits ESG as dependent variable, meanwhile, 
consequence model places corporate performance as dependent variable, that is was represented by 
Tobin’s Q and return on equity (ROE). Tobin’s Q used two years observation to present short and 
long term effects.  Following equations show the regression model to be tested to answer two 
hyphoteses.  
 
ESG = α + β1BS + β2DS + β3TYPE + β4DTA + β5LnTA + β6LnPPE + β7ROA + 𝜀3.......... (1) 
LnROE1 = α + β1ESG + β2BS + β3DS + β4TYPE + β5DTA + β6LnTA + β7LnPPE + 𝜀3...... (2) 
Q, Q1 = α + β1ESG + β2BS + β3DS + β4TYPE + β5DTA + β6LnTA + β7PPE + 𝜀3.............. (3)  
All variable included ESG, board of commisioner (BS), board of director (DS), corporate 
performance (Tobin’s Q and ROE), firm size (LnTA), leverage (DTA), plant poperty equipment 
(PPE).  ESGD is disclosure related to environmental, social and governance, representing 
transparancy, risk and opportunity of corporates. ESGD was measured by ESGD Bloomberg score. 
Range score is between one to one hundred, the number indicates the level of transparance; higher 
number higher transparance. Score includes seven indicators, those are energy and emission, waste, 
independent commisioners/directors, the number of women on board of commisioner, accident, and 
spesific sector. 
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Board of commisioner and director (DS) was measured by board size (BS) and board of 
directors size (DS), y.i. the number of commisioner and director members. Corporate financial 
performance is defined financial performance earned from how market participants perceive corporate 
profitability based on past, current and future risk and stock, reflected on stock price in the process of 
supply and demand. This definition refers to Kim & Statman (2012) dan Orlitzky et al. (2003). CFP 
was approched by two measures, y.i. Tobin’s Q and ROE. Tobin’s Q was calculated by the market 
value of total equity plus debt divided by total assets, following Ming & Eam (2016), Conheady et al., 
(2014), Christensen et al. (2013) dan Renders et al. (2010). This study uses five control variables 
namely firm size, leverage, profitability, firm type, and LnPPE as previous research.  
.   
 
4. FINDINGS AND ARGUMENT 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics that shows almost the average of all variables are low, 
except LnPPE and LnTA. Corporate performance represented by Tobin's Q (Q) and LnROE is also 
low. For Tobin's Q, year t (Q) and t + 1 (Q1) almost have the similar minimum, maximum and 
average values, or relatively unchanged. The ESG variable with an average of 19.49 and a maximum 
of 51.65 is relatively high for Indonesia, because IDX has not required ESG disclosure and no training 
has been provided to the company yet. Moreover, the results of a global survey by CFA Institute 
(2017) shows 27% of companies studied did not use ESG in consideration of investment analysis. 
Board characteristics (i.e. board size (BS)) and member of directors (DS)) have a fairly high average, 
that is 6.10 and 6.84. Profitability (ROA) and leverage (DTA) has the farthest range with average is 
also quite low. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviations 
Q 0,61 18,64 2,34 3,14 
Q1 0,55 18,40 2,22 2,77 
LnROE -1,55 5,64 2,34 1,25 
ESG 6,14 51,65 19,49 12,20 
BS 3 12 6,10 1,84 
DS 2 11 6,84 2,17 
DTA 0,00 79,14 21,71 18,40 
LnTA 1,78 2,62 2,27 0,19 
LnPPE 0,91 12,36 8,51 1,75 
ROA -17,09 48,78 5,50 10,07 
TYPE 0,00 1,00 0,21 0,41 
 
Table 2 provides the result of correlation analysis, indicating the consistency of results by 
regression analysis, where the board size (BS) is negatively correlated significantly with Q, Q1 and 
LnROE. Director members (DS) are negatively correlated with LnROE. Leverage (DTA) is 
negatively correlated with Q and Q1, LnTA and LnPPE are positively correlated with LnROE and 
TYPE positively correlated with Q and Q1. Furthermore, the correlations among independent 
variables show a relationship that is not significant or significant with a low coefficient. These results 
indicate that the classical assumptions of multicollinearity are fulfilled. 
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Table 2. Correlation 
 
 Q Q1 LN_ 
ROE1 
ESG BS DS DTA LnTA LN_PPE ROA 
ESG 0,046 0,084 0,152        
BS -0,187* -0,163* -0,178* 0,198**       
DS -0,099 -0,088 0,074 -0,160* 0,021      
DTA -
0,278** 
-
0,258** 
-0,045 -0,058 -0,119 -0,093      
LnTA -0,085 -0,074 0,175* 0,097 0,252** 0,409*** 0,009    
LnPPE -0,085 0,018 0,295** 0,304** 0,175*** 0,175 0,131 0,585***   
ROA    0,095 -0,124 -0,047 -
0,464*** 
-0,033 0,066  
TYPE 0,262** 0,257** 0,020 0,120 0,067* 0,149 -0,134 -0,023 0,035 0,227** 
Note: ***significant at 0,000, **significant at 0,05, *significant at 0,10  
 
4.2. The relationship between board characteristics and ESGD 
The regression results in Table 4 show that the number of boards of directors (DS) influence ESG 
negatively significant with the coefficient value of -1.385 significance level 0,1. This result indicates 
that the large members of the board of directors (DS) inhibit disclosure in a transparent manner. The 
number of functions and different interests of each function alleged to be the cause of this negative 
relationship. Meanwhile, board size (BS) has no significant effect on ESG with coefficient value 
0,309 at significance level more than 0,1 (0,726). These results indicate that the role of board size of 
commissioners in driving the ESGD has not been as expected yet. Thus, the first hypothesis is partial 
supported. 
These results are different from Yusoff et al. (2016) and Jizi et al. (2014) findings, who found 
a positive relationship between board size and CSR disclosure, which means that the more members 
of the board of commissioners there is a tendency for higher disclosure and it can be interpreted as 
increasingly transparent. The difference in these results may be due to differences in sample, country 
and measurement. Yusoff et al used non-financial companies while this study uses financial and non-
financial companies that have ESGD scores. Yusoff et al. used the object of firms in Malaysia, while 
this research is company specific in Indonesia. Although Malaysia and Indonesia are in one clump, 
Malaysia is included in the category of developed countries, while Indonesia is still in a group of 
developing countries. In terms of measurement, Yusoff et al. used the measurement index with four 
dimensions of disclosure type, while the study used a single measure containing seven indicator 
themes. Jizi et al. (2014) also used different samples and measurements. They used US commercial 
banks and measure CSR disclosures by ranking out four categories of CSR. 
4.3. The relationship between board characteristics and corporate performance 
In Table 3,  the interesting finding of this study is shown by the negative relationship between board 
size of commissioners and corporate performance; consistent for Tobin's Q (t and t + 1) as well as 
LnROE; as shown in Table 4 respectively by the BS-0,520 coefficients for Q, -0.466 for Q1 and -
0.249 for Ln ROE. The result support second hypotheses. The finding indicate that the larger board 
size will exacerbate corporate performance. This result supports negative stream as the findings of 
Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998). Another possible explanation is that the large number of 
boards of commissioners will increase the amount of money allocated to provide them with a 
significant amount of salary, benefits and compensation. This is apparently disliked by market 
participants so that market performance (Tobin's Q) decrease. It seems like hypothesized, 
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coordination and communication problems leads to bad decision making so accounting performance 
(LnROE) declines. Lipton and Lorsch (1992 and Jensen (1993) argument that larger boards are lesser 
effective. 
Table 3 Multiple Regression  
 
Dependent 
variables  
ESG Tobin’s Qt (Q) Tobin’s Qt+1 (Q1) 
 
LnROE 
 coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  
ESG -  0,000  0,002  0,012  
BS 0,309  -0,520 ** -0,466 ** -0,249 ** 
DS -1,385 * -0,283  -0,219  -0,036  
DTA -0,074  -0,051 ** -0,045 ** -0,011  
LnTA -1,023  0,805  -0,566  0,851  
LnPPE 2,451 ** 0,102  0,325  0,237 ** 
ROA -0,018  -  -  -  
TYPE 3,733  2,349 ** 1,967 ** 0,188  
         
Adjusted R 
Square 
0,085  0,148  0,141  0,097  
F-statistic 1,955  2,781  2,683  1,888  
p-value 0,075 * 0,014 ** 0,017  0,091 * 
DW 2,248  1,929  1,919  2,245  
n 73  73  73  73  
 
4.4 The relationship between ESGD and corporate performance 
 
Three models linking ESGD to corporate performance are shown in Table 3.  The Table shows that 
ESGD does not affect corporate performance, whether measured by market performance (Tobin's Q), 
for the same year (t) or one year (t + 1) , as well as accounting performance (LnROE), this means the 
third hypothesis is also not supported. These results indicate that ESGD has not been a factor 
considered in decision-making by key stakeholders of investors. This evidence differs from the 
findings of Li et al (2018) and El Ghoul et al. (2016) who found a significant positive relationship 
between ESG and Tobin's Q and also Fatemi et al's findings. (2017), who found a significant negative 
relationship between ESG and Tobin's Q. 
 
4.5 Control variables, ESG and corporate performance 
 
Control variables LnPPE affects ESG and also influences corporate performance (as measured by 
LnROE) positively significant. These results indicate that the higher the tangible asset (LnPPE) the 
larger the ESG disclosure and the higher the Ln ROE. This means the transparency function as the 
main objective of ESG disclosure has not been realized because the area of disclosure is more 
determined by tangible assets than on social, environmental and corporate governance factors. This 
occurs also to corporate performance, which is influenced by the size of tangible assets too. This 
result is somewhat disappoint because, governance, social and environmental components are 
expected to be the decisive factor in the realization of corporate sustainability. 
Other analysis results show that leverage (DTA) has negative effect with coefficient of -0.051 
to Q and Q1 with coefficient of -0.045, in line with findings of Fatemi et al. (2017) but different from 
the findings of Li et al. (2017) found no association between leverage and Tobin's Q. The firm type 
(TYPE) was also found to positively affect Q and Q1 with coefficients of 2,349 and 1,967, 
respectively. However, the results show that DTA and TYPE have no effect on accounting 
performance (LnROE). LnROE is positively influenced by LnPPE. 
4.6 Additional Analysis 
Additional analysis is performed to test the consistency of the relationship of board 
characteristics on corporate performance by including ROA accounting performance variable as 
independent variable. This analysis was done because ESG was found not to have an effect on 
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company performance. This raises the notion that market participants in Indonesia may not be 
particularly interested in non-financial information in the investment decision-making process. In 
other words, investors rely more on financial information than non-financial information. 
The analysis results appear in Table 4, which shows that board size no longer affects firm 
performance after ROA is included in the regression equation. Leverage (DTA) has significant 
positive effect (with coefficient 0,029), LnPPE has significant negative effect (with coefficient -
0.378), ROA has positive significant effect (with coefficient 0,279) to corporate performance as 
measured by Tobin's Q. 
The results of this analysis also affect the better model with the greater the F-statistic value, 
from the original 2.781 to 22.826, and the adjusted R square value from the original 0.148 to 0.708. 
These results support the notion that investors in the Indonesian capital market are statistically proven 
that they rely on financial information rather than non-financial information in decision making. This 
result is in contrast to the CFA Institute (2017) survey results, which indicate that 66% of respondents 
stated that ESG disclosure was done due to investor demand. 
 
Table 4 Additional Test  
 
Dependent variables Tobin’s Qt (Q) 
 coefficient t sig  
Constant 0,342 0,131 0,896  
ESG 0,002 0,136 0,892  
BS -0,045 -0,351 0,727  
DS -0,083 -0,767 0,446  
DTA 0,029 2,144 0,036 ** 
LnTA 1,636 1,134 0,261  
LnPPE -0,378 -2,340 0,022 ** 
ROA 0,279 11,215 0,000 *** 
TYPE 0,797 1,489 0,141  
Adjusted R Square 0,708    
F-statistic 22,826    
p-value 0,000 ***   
DW 2,233    
n 73    
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The results showed that the board characteristics represented by the number of members of 
the board of directors (DS) had a significant negative impact on ESG disclosure, but did not affect the 
corporate performance (Tobin's Q and LnROE). While the board size does not affect the disclosure of 
ESG, but negatively affect corporate performance. However, these results are inconsistent based on 
additional analysis, when the profitability variable (ROA) is included as an independent variable in 
the model changing the board size results to have no significant effect on corporate performance 
(Tobin's Q). Therefore, continued research should continue to be carried out by considering factors 
other than those contained in the model. Exploring corporate governance components other than 
board characteristics and those not an indicator of ESG can also be an upcoming research opportunity. 
Transparency measures other than the Bloomberg ESGD Score can also be an upcoming research 
challenge, for example by using Thomson Reuters ESG Score using the appropriate context. 
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